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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Courts • Creditors' Rights • Debtors' Protection - Sequestration
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
INCE 1969, AND TE DECISION in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,'
the confrontation between the creditor and the constitution has
continued apace. 2 Sniadach began an expansion of the measure of due
process applicable to creditors' prejudgment remedies, and heralded a new
era of protection for the property interests of vendee-debtors under the
cloak of the fourteenth amendment.
3 However, the most recent decision
of the Supreme Court on summary prejudgment remedies, Mitchell v. W.
T. Grant Co.,4 appears to have abruptly halted that expansion and has
returned judicial thinking to a concept of due process prevalent in the
pre-Sniadach era.5 Accordingly, a new analysis of the role of due process
in the context of secured transactions and prejudgment remedies is in order.
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.-A NEW TREND
Petitioner Mitchell had purchased from the W. T. Grant Co. a
refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine. In February, 1972, the
seller found Mitchell's account overdue, with an unpaid balance of
$574.14.6 In accordance with the Louisiana statutes, the seller filed in the
First City Court of New Orleans for judgment in the amount owed and
an ex parte writ of sequestration.
7 Based upon the vendor's allegations that
the vendee-debtor would seek to alienate, encumber, or dispose of the
merchandise in question, the writ was issued and the property seized
8
under the prejudgment remedies permitted under the Louisiana statutes.
9
1395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2 Clark and Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Consti-
tution, 59 U. VA. L REv. 355 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clark and Landers];
McDonnell, Sniadach, The Replevin Cases and Self-Help Repossession, 14 B.C. IND. &
COMM. L. REv. 437 (1973).
3 Post-Sniadach decisions extending due process requirements in summary prejudgment
situations include at the Supreme Court level: Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Randone v. Appellate Dept.
of Super Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971), cert. denied 407
U.S. 924 (1972); Schwarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4 Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
5 Pre-Sniadach decisions upheld the proposition that the requirements of due process
do not compel notice and opportunity for a hearing prior to a summary taking. See,
McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 280 (1928); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29
(1927); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1920).
6 416 U.S. at 601.
7 LA. CODE CIV. PRo. ANN. art. 281, 3501, 3510, 3571 (West 1960).
8 416 U.S. at 601.
9 LA. CODE Crv. PRo. ANN. art. 3501, 3571 (West 1960). Art. 3571 reads in pertinent part:
[360]
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One month later, Mitchell filed for dissolution of the writ, claiming
that the property was exempt from seizure under state law and that the
ex parte sequestration was violative of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' 0 Both claims were denied in the state court
system; upon certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court decisions."
The question considered by the Court was whether the sequestration
violated the requirements of due process, as it was ordered ex parte
without prior notice or opportunity for a hearing.12 In a five-to-four
decision, the Court held that Louisiana's sequestration procedure
committed no violation of due process13
Speaking for the majority, Justice White relied on several theories to
uphold the sequestration. The primary concern of the Court was striking
a balance between the property interests of the debtor and creditor as
delineated by state law.14 Weighing both interests, the Court found it
necessary to tip the balance in favor of the seller on the basis that the
seller's interest in the property was constantly eroding. Although the debtor
holds possession and an encumbered title which is subject to defeasance
upon default, the seller's interest is even more precarious. Not only is the
money value of the secured property depreciating with normal use, but
the creditor's money interest in the property is also decreasing. 5 The
Court held that the state is permitted to recognize these considerations
and provide a protectional advantage to the seller. 18 Additionally, the
vendee-debtor is afforded protection by the statute: A bond must be filed
to protect the vendee against damages, the nature and amount of the
vendor's claim must be specified to guard against error, an immediate
hearing is available to the vendee for the dissolution of the writ, and the
vendee may file his own bond to have the property returned.' 7 Secondly,
... When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a
mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized under
a writ of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant to conceal,
dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the
property from the parish during the pendency of the action.
10U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which reads: ... . No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."
"416 U.S. at 603.
lId.
13Id.
14 Id. at 604.
lId. at 606.
16 Id. at 608.
17Id. at 607; LA. CODE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 3507, 3508 (West 1960). It is interesting
to note that even though provisions for the release of the secured property are
available to the vendee-debtor, it is unlikely that he would be able to furnish the
Winter, 1975]
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there was an allegedly exceptional and emergent need that arose out of the
doctrine of property law which permits a vendor's lien to be defeated by
transfer of the property to a bona fide purchaser.
18 Notice to the vendee
of a pending hearing would afford him with the opportunity to make such
a transfer and thus defeat the creditors' claims entirely.
19 Third, the Court
dealt with the question of a need for determination of entitlement prior
to a deprivation. Deciding that case law did not indicate any mandate for
an adversary proceeding prior to deprivation, it was held that establishing
the probable success of the seller in a subsequent hearing would be
sufficient basis for seizure of the property.
2
Thus, the majority concluded that the impact of a deprivation on
the buyer did not override the potential problems of the seller in collecting
his judgment.21 As the requirements of due process are general, not
technical or procedural, the Louisiana statute was held to have reached
a constitutional accommodation of the interests of both parties,22 as
the creditor rather than the debtor had a more pressing need for the
protections of the fourteenth amendment.23
The decision is a radical departure from what has gone before. To
understand the problems of the Mitchell decision, and the implications
it has for the future, one must first consider the due process clause itself
and the role it has played in the field of secured transactions.
required bond. In most situations, if the cash were available, the time payment
purchase method would not have been used. When viewed in this light, Arts. 3507
and 3508 provide questionable protection. See generally, Dreyfuss, Due Process
Denied: Consumer Default Judgments in New York City, 10 COLUM. J.L.& Soc.
PROBS. 370 (1974), for a sociological approach to the realities of consumer default
proceedings; see also White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Reposses-
sions, Resales, and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 808, 810-812 (1970).
18 416 U.S. at 608-609.
19 Id. at 609.
20 Id. Cases relied upon by the petitioner as contra the proposition stated by the
Court are listed at 416 U.S. 611, n. 10, and include Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Covy v. Town of
Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); New York v. N.Y., N.H. & H. Ry. Co., 344 U.S. 293
(1953); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950);
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S.
126 (1941); West Ohio Gas Co. v. P.U.C. of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63 (1935); United States
v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290
U.S. 190 (1933); Goldsmith v. U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926);
Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915); Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373 (1908); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Roller
v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Scott v.
McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 274 (1876);
Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 128 (1875); Rees v. City of Watertown, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 107 (1874); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1864).
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THE BACKGROUND FOR THE MITCHELL DECISION-
DuE PROCESS AND PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
Traditionally, due process is held to mandate proper procedure; this
was the import intended by the authors of the Bill of Rights.24 However, it
soon became apparent that the protection extending only to compliance
with proper procedures would still permit injustices to occur under
arbitrary and capricious statutes. 25 Therefore, the meaning of due process
was extended to cover substantive concerns also. The substantive-
procedural duality has been accepted as valid since 1887.26 The due
process clause has thus evolved as a barrier against any state action
that is arbitrary and unreasonableY
In accordance with these concepts, the decisions in Sniadach and
Fuentes were handed down, and interpreted by many jurisdictions, as a
broad indictment of creditors' remedies against the strictures of due
process. 28 Doubt was cast upon the accepted and customary practices of
repossession and garnishment that sent shock waves through the entire
field of secured transactions; it appeared that closely related summary
remedies were destined to perish of similar constitutional infirmity.29
In Sniadach, Family Finance Corporation instituted a prejudgment
garnishment action against Sniadach and her employer to collect on a
defaulted promissory note. The petitioner complained that the prejudgment
garnishment was violative of the fourteenth amendment in that neither
notice nor opportunity for a hearing was provided. The majority, basing
its holding on congressional investigations, law review commentaries, and
the traditional concept of due process, found that garnishment gave the
creditor tremendous leverage over the debtor and concluded that a
taking of property which was so obvious clearly violated due process
absent notice and a prior hearing.30
Shortly thereafter, Fuentes was decided and broadly extended the
doctrines laid down in Sniadach. The petitioners in Fuentes challenged
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes,
which permitted issuance of a prejudgment writ of replevin upon ex parte
application to a court clerk. Seizure followed, without notice or
opportunity for a hearing.n The statutes were held unconstitutional in
that they worked "a deprivation of property without due process of law
24 
See, STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1783
(1833).
25 See, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 518 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2 BAllgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
27 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
28 See, Clark and Landers, supra note 2, at 357, for indexing and discussion of such
holdings.
29 See, Clark and Landers, supra note 2, at 355-56.
30 395 U.S. at 340.
31407 U.S. at 77-78.
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insofar as they denied the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before
chattels are taken from their possessor. '32 Additionally, the court rejected
the gradient concept of property interest which is a basis of the balancing
theory used by the Mitchell court, stating that a deprivation was a
deprivation regardless of duration.33
With such an expansive spirit being manifested in invalidating
summary prejudgment remedies, most jurisdictions began to follow suit.
3 4
At that point, the controversy shifted to the constitutionality of self-help
remedies which did not involve state action. In Adams v. Egley and
Adams v. Southern California First National Bank,
3 5 the courts turned
their attention to self-help repossession as typified by sections 9-503 and
9-504 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
38 In a decision that caused a
favorable stir among creditors, the district court held that there was no
state action involved in self-help repossession under the Code,3 and any
such action was therefore immune from the requirements of the
fourteenth amendment.-
3 The Supreme Court let the decision stand
by denying certiorari.3s
32 407 U.S. at 96.
33 407 U.S. at 84-85.
34 See notes 3 and 28, supra.
35Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom, Adams v.
Southeern California First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied
43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (1974).
36 UNWORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 provides:
Secured Party's Right to Take Possession After Default. Unless otherwise agreed
a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In
taking possession, a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this
can be done without a breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the
security agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to
assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place
to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both
parties. Without removal, a secured party may render equipment unusuable, and
may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 9-504.
UNWORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 provides in pertinent part: "Secured Party's Right
to Dispose of Collateral After Default; Effect of Disposition. (1) A secured party
after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its
then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing."
37492 F.2d at 328-38.
38Id.
3943 U.S.L.W. 3281 (1974). However, in spite of the Adams decision, the constitution-
ality of self-help repossession will continue to be debated. Compare, Brodsky, Consti-
tutionality of Self-Help Repossession Under the U.C.C.: The Eighth and Ninth Circuits
Speak, 19 S. DAK. L. REv. 295 (1974) (which contains an excellent discussion of the
practical aspects of self-help repossession); Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession
Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14
WM. & MARY L. REv. 767 (1973); and Security Interests: Self-Help Still an Available
Method of Repossession, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 231 (1973); with Hughes, Creditors
Self-Help Remedies Under U.C.C. § 9-503: Violative of Due Process in Texas, 5
ST. MARY's LJ. 701 (1974) (which contains an interesting discussion of the
"encouragement" theory as state action); Yudof, Reflections on Private Repossessions,
Public Policy and the Constitution, 122 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 954 (1974); and Adams
v. Southern California First National Bank-The End of a Notable Beginning? 35
U. Prrr. J. Rav. 882 (1974).
[Vol. 8:2AKRON LAw Rv~364
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Thus, the law on summary prejudgment remedies was left in a
peculiar state of flux. The Supreme Court was invalidating the remedies
conducted under the auspices of state authority, while self-help
remedies were being upheld by the lower courts. This surely will move
most creditors toward the vigilante remedies outlined in section 9-503
and 9-504 of the U.C.C., which are less complex, less expensive, more
efficient, and have survived the constitutional infirmities that have afflicted
state action remedies.
40
A synthesis and clarification of standards for prejudgment remedies
was needed; Mitchell provided the court with opportunity. However, the
Mitchell decision only further muddied the waters, by adopting a
questionable rationale and failing to either uphold or overrule Fuentes
and Sniadach. The only clear indication one can draw from Mitchell and
its precedents is that the issue of summary prejudgment remedies is
ripe for relitigation.
THE PROnLEMS POSED BY THE MITCHELL DECISION
Both Justice Stewart's 4' and Justice Brennan's dissents42 and Justice
Powell's concurring opinion43 indicate the pressing need for the Court to
deal with Fuentes in some manner other than distinguishing it on the
facts. Justice Powell points out that the Court in Fuentes:
... enunciated the principle that the constitutional guarantee of
procedural due process requires an adversary hearing before an
individual may be temporarily deprived of any possessory interest in
tangible personal property, however brief the dispossession and
however slight his monetary interest in the property. The court's
decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that
principle and to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes'
opinion is overruled.
44
Had the majority so held, matters would be simpler and the needed
40 The state action question itself remains far from settled. In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the court commented upon the impossibility
of devising a formula for determining the presence or absence of state action, and
reiterated the point in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Few cases
provide any guidelines. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 43 U.S.L.W.
4110 (Dec. 23, 1974); Evans v. Abbey, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). Compare Comment, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L.
RFv. 840 (1974) (a discussion of the Court's refusal to find a basis for state action,
and for support of the theory that individual rights should be balanced against
asserted government obligations on a case by case basis); with Elkind, State Action:
Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 656 (1974) (which suggests evaluating underlying policies to determine presence
or absence of state action). See also, Note, Constitutional Restrictions on Termination
of Services by Privately Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. RaV. 205 (1974).
41416 U.S. at 629.
42 Id. at 636.
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clarification provided. 45 Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion also admon-
ished the Court for playing fast and loose with the principle of stare
decisis; 46 a terse dissent by Justice Brennan also digs at the majority's
position on Fuentes, stating only that the Louisiana statutes should be
overturned on the basis of that decision.
47
The majority's factual distinction is weak. The statutes involved are
remarkably similar.48 In either case, all that is required to support issuance
of an ex parte writ for seizure is the filing of a complaint and an affidavit
containing pro forma allegations of the seller's entitlement.
49 Justice White
relies on the fact that in Fuentes the writ was issued by the court clerk
rather than by a judge, as was the established procedure in Orleans
parish; 50 upon that distinction White rested the conclusion that in
Louisiana the entire procedure leading to the deprivation was accom-
plished under judicial supervision and therefore comported with the
requirements of due process.
5'
Such a distinction relies too heavily on form as opposed to substance.
Although there is admittedly a difference in status between a court clerk
and a judge, the requirements and intents of the statutes are identical. The
proceedings are merely pro forma, facilitating a final determination prior
to any actual adversary proceeding. Neither requires more than a "bare
bones" allegation of entitlement and default;
52 neither offers an opportun-
ity for the vendee-debtor to present available defenses as required by
Fuentes.53 One would not expect a creditor to advise the magistrate that a
default had occurred as a result of a controversy over a service contract
or a breach of warranty question; nor is such information required. The
writ is issued. Whether the writ is issued by a judge or clerk is not relevant,
the information required is far too one-sided to permit an adequate
determination of whether a prejudgment deprivation applicable under state
law should be authorized.
54 The court's failure to overrule Fuentes has
45 At this point, the only thing that is clear is that secured creditors are currently safe
in moving with self-help repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code, rather
than relying upon the state action remedies which would involve state action and
could be contested on that basis in spite of the Mitchell holding.
46 416 U.S. at 634-636.
47 Id. at 636.
48 The Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes required that allegations of entitle-
ment be made before a court clerk, while the Louisiana statute required that it be
made before a judge. The posting of a security bond in any of the states gives the
defendant the right to regain possession. None require prior notice of prejudgment
seizure.
49 Compare LA. Cove Cirv. PRo. ANN. art. 281, 3501, 3510 (West 1960) with FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 78.01, 78.07, 78.08 (Supp. 1972-73); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12 § 1821
(1901); and Pa. R. Civ. P. 1073.
50 LA. CoDE Civ. PRo. ANN. art. 281 (West 1960).
51416 U.S. at 616.
52 See note 49, supra.
53 407 U.S. 73-79.
541d. at 83, 94.
[Vl. 8:2
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thus resulted in two exactly opposite holdings on parallel fact situations.
There are other internal problems in the Mitchell rationale. The
court is unable to synthesize any standard as to when notice and hearing
will be required; instead a negative approach is taken that results in a
determination that such procedures are not essential in the instant fact
situation. This negative determination does little to establish clear and
predictable standards. The majority rests the "non-notice" concept of due
process on a line of special circumstances cases which upheld a denial of
formal procedural due process in particular circumstances. 55 An example
is found in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,56 in which a union member's
security badge was revoked without notice or opportunity for a hearing;
consequently, she was denied her employment at a lunch counter on a
military base. The court held that the revocation without notice and
hearing did not violate due process, due to the well-established principle
of the government's power to manage the internal operations of a federal
military establishment, and the traditional extent of governmental control
for military security reasons excused the government from applying typical
fourteenth amendment formalisms.57 The case turns on an exception-an.
overriding military security interest-rather than a rule. The other cases
cited suffer the same weaknesses; all turn on some exceptional overriding
governmental interest in a sense other than that of a secured transaction. 58
No such exceptional need or overriding governmental or creditor
interest that would suffice to overrule the requirements of due process was
advanced by the Burger Court in Mitchell. Rather, the majority appeared
frightened by the phantom that notice would afford the vendee-debtor an
opportunity to alienate the security and defeat the creditor's claim. 59 The
argument that due process would be abused by some, so therefore, will
be awarded to none is an anomaly that would shock any student of
constitutional law. Too, in Fuentes the Court espoused the proposition
that only in exceptional circumstances could the deprivation of a property
interest encompassed by the fourteenth amendment be accomplished
without notice and/or opportunity to be heard. 60 It was additionally made
clear that the ordinary interest of a creditor in collecting his judgment is
not sufficient to justify overriding the fourteenth amendment.61 A hearing
prior to deprivation is founded on strong precedents. 62 The Court itself
55416 U.S. at 610.
56 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
57 Id.
58Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (the overriding governmental interest in
protecting children); Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697 (1945) (ques-
tioned only the proper time for the hearing); N.L.R.B. v. MacKay Co., 304 U.S.
333 (1938) (concerned with governmental interest in facilitating the end of a strike).
59 416 U.S. at 609.
60 407 U.S. at 82. See also, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
61407 U.S. at 91-94.
62 Id. at 82.
Winter, 1975]
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indicates its hesitancy and strictly limits its holdings.
63
The Mitchell decision also fails to resolve other constitutional
questions presented by summary prejudgment remedies. Even if consti-
tutional strictures of due process are held inapplicable in the future,
summary prejudgment remedies could still stumble over fourth amend-
ment prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure. The idea
has already found some supporters."
The departure from Fuentes and the notice and opportunity concept
espoused therein only two years after the decision was made is a startling
departure from the principle of stare decisis and perhaps can only be
explained by Justice Stewart's comment:
The only perceivable change that has occurred since the Fuentes case
is in the makeup of this court.
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change
in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institu-
tion is little different from the two political branches of the govern-
ment. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this court
and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.
65
It is difficult to find other grounds for the transition in the style of
application of due process.
There is no clear indicia at this time whether the Court will continue
to extend its narrow view that due process does not require notice or a
hearing. It is possible that the Mitchell decision could be narrowly con-
strued on the basis that a judge issues a writ in Orleans parish; most statutes
delegate the responsibility to court clerks. Also, Fuentes remains on the
books as good law and supplies strong precedent for invalidating summary
prejudgment remedies clearly conducted under the auspices of the state.
In any respect, it is clear from the Mitchell decision that the role
of the due process clause in the field of secured transactions is by no
means settled.6 6 Only a relitigation will clarify the matter.
SANDRA J. PIcKUT
63 416 U.S. 618, n.13, in which the court sets limitations on its holdings.
64 See, Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
which held that the fourth amendment is available to prevent intrusions in both civil
and criminal matters as well as prehearing seizures without the intervention or order
of a judicial officer. This holding would provide a valid tactical weapon against
summary prejudgment remedies that did not involve judicial action and could provide
a means for establishing a more extensive factual inquiry prior to a deprivation.
65 416 U.S. at 635-36. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in the Fuentes
decision. See 407 U.S. at 97. For the standard operation of stare decisis, see generally,
GOLDBERG, EQUAL JusTICE 65-99 (1971); LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADrrTON
(1960).
66 The Supreme Court's most recent confrontation with the prejudgment remedy
issue came in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W.
4192 (Jan. 22, 1975). The opinion serves only to emphasize the Court's own confusion
on the status of prejudgment remedies. In the instant case, a corporate bank account
[Vol 8:2
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was garnisheed; the garnishment was invalidated on the basis of Fuentes and
Sniadach in that there was no opportunity for early hearing and no participation in
the obtaining of an affidavit by a judicial officer. The Mitchell case was used as a
buttress for the Fuentes and Snaidach holdings, upon which the decision rested. 43
U.S.L.W. at 4194. Justice Stewart concurred at 43 U.S.L.W. 4194, celebrating the
reincarnation of Fuentes. Also concurring was Justice Powell, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4194-
4195, who stated that prejudgment remedy statutes should contain (1) posting of
adequate security bond by the creditor, (2) establishment before a neutral officer
of a factual basis for resorting to prejudgment seizure, (3) prompt post-garnishment
judicial hearing, and (4) provisions for the debtor to post security bond for return
of the goods seized.
However, a bitter dissent by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, 43 U.S.L.W. at
4196, complains that this matter has been before the Court three times in the past
three years and no adequate standard has been set. The Justices contend that Fuentes
was decided by a "bob-tailed court" and should have been reargued, rather than
leaving the apparent standard of a case-by-case determination. Justice Burger also
objected, 43 U.S.L.W. at 4198, to the case-by-case determination.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Marriage Rights • Homosexuals and Transsexuals
B. v. B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1974)
W HAT IS A MARRIAGE? Although there are several definitions,' they all
contain one common element: the union of one man and one woman.
However, if a particular state had no statute which specifically required
that marriage be between a man and a woman would the courts uphold
a marriage between members of the same sex? The New York Supreme
Court, in B. v. B.,2 answered that question in the negative. In that case
the wife brought an action for annulment on the ground that her husband
was a female, 3 and the husband attempted to amend his answer and
counterclaim for a divorce on the ground of abandonment. 4 The court
1"... the civil status, condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law
for life, for the discharge to each other and the community of the duties legally
incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the distinction of sex." BLACK'S
LAw DiCTIONARY 1123 (4th rev. ed. 1968); "The institution whereby men and women
are joined in a special kind of social and legal dependence for the purpose of found-
ing and maintaining a family." WBSTER'S SEvENTH NEw COLLEGIATE DicTIONARY
518 (1966).
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